Restructuring of the Spanish integrated dteel vompany Corporación de la Siderurgia Integral. Communication from the Commission to the Council. SEC (92) 1916 final, 5 November 1992 by unknown
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
SEC(92)  1916  final  Brussels, 5  November  1992 
Restructuring of  the  Spanish  Integrated Steel  Company 
Corporaci6n  de  Ia  Siderurgia  Integral 
Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Counci I Restructuring of  tho Soan!sh  Integrated Steel  Qomoany 
QorDQraciOn  de  Ia  Slderurgla  Integral 
Communication  from  the Commission  to  the Counci I 
1.  lntroduct ion 
1.1  On  12  Apri I  1992  the Spanish  Government  notified  the Commission 
of  a  plan  to  restructure  the  Spanish  integrated  steel  company 
Corporaci6n  de  Ia  Slderurgla  Integral  (CSI),  incorporating 
Altos  Hornos  de  Vizcaya  (AHV)  and  Ensldesa. 
·Under· the  plan,  as  from  1  January  1993  AHV  and  Ensidesa  would 
cease  to  operate  and  their  activities would  be  taken  over  by  a 
new  company,  to  whom  their  assets and  certain  I labl I ities would 
be  transferred.  The  plan  Involves  a  number  of  industrial, 
commercial,  social  and  financial  restructuring  measures  which 
would  not  be  finally  completed  until  1998,  and  envisages  that 
the  new  company  should achieve  vlabl I lty by  1996. 
· ·  1. 2  AccordIng  to  the  Spanish  Government,  the  tot  a I  cost  of  the 
restructuring  would  be  599  billion ·pesetas  (4.3  becus).  In 
addition  there  would  be  commercial  and  industrial  investments 
total I ing  205-220  billion  pesetas  (a  maximum  of  1 ;571  becus) 
which  the  plan  envisages  would  be  financed  by  the  new  company 
through  a  cpmbinatlon  of  commercial  loans  and  - cashflow 
generated  by  the  business.  Accord-Ingly  the  total·cost  of  the 
overall  restructuring  is  804-824  billion  pesetas  (5742 
5885  mecus) . 
1.3 Since  the  financing  of  the  plan  Includes  aid  elements  that  are 
incompatible  with  Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  and  with  the 
provisions  of  Commission  Decision  3855/91/ECSC  (the  current 
Steel  Aids  Code)  these  measures  can  be  authorised  only  if  the 
Commission  adopts  a  derogation decision under  Article 95  of  the 
ECSC  Treaty,  which  requires  the  unanimous  assent of  the Counci I 
and  consultation  of  the  ECSC  consultative  Committee.  This 
communi cat ion  out lines  the  Commission's  proposed  approach  to 
the  case. - 2  -
1.4 Both  AHV  and  Ensldesa's  Iron  and  steel  making  is  principally 
based  In  the  Vlzcaya  (BasQue)  and'  Asturias  regions 
respectively,  both  of  which  face  social  and  economic  problems. 
Vizcaya  has  a  1986-90  GOP  per  inhabitant I  of  85.3  (Euro  12  -
100)  and  an  unemployment  rate  (1987-91)  ef  222.4  (Euro  12  .. 
100)  and  is  an  Objective  2  region  and  Is  J1 igible  for  national 
I 
regional  aid  under  Article 93.2(c).  Asturias  has  a  1986-90  GOP 
per  inhabitant  of 71.5  (Euro  12  •  100)  andlan  unemployment  rate 
of  196.2  <Euro  12- 100)  and  is el ig.lble  ,or  national  regional 
aid under  Article 93.2(a).  It  is an  Objective  1  region. 
1.5  ~arket situation 
After  the  boom  of  1989-90  the steel  industry  is currently going 
through  a  difficult  period.  This  is  ~ue  to  the  general 
slowdown  in  the  economy,  stagnatIng  dema~d,  oversupp I  y  and  a 
col lapse  in  prices.  Compared  to  1989,  pri~es have  been  reduced 
by  20%  on  average  (30%  for  certain  long  pr~ducts).  In  add it ion 
to  these  internal  factors  the  internatibnal  market  and  the 
dollar  are  weak,  there  Is  pressure  from  i~ports,  in  particular 
from  Eastern  Europe  and  a  trade  dispute  w~th  the  USA  affecting 
50%  of  EC  exports  to  that  market.  All  of  these  factors  combine 
to  aggravate  the  financial  situati.on  olf  almost  all  steel 
companies  in  the  Community. 
Unless  measures  are  taken  to  bring  about  a  better  balance 
I 
between  supply  and  demand  an  increase  in  the  price  level  cannot 
be  expected.  ConseQuently  companies  ~ust  devise  their 
strategies  so  as  to  take  account  of  relaltively  high  supplies 
and  depressed  prices  and  to  reduce  their  Jests  so  as  to  remain 
competitive.  In  order  to  achieve  this  ~~objective  particular 
attenti·on  will  have  to  be  paid  to  the  level  of  production 
capacity  and  ways  of  adaptIng  it  to  demajd.  Ana I  ys is  carried 
ou·t  by  the  Comml ss ion,  with  two  scenarIos,  shows  that 
I 
overcapacity  in  hot  ro 1 1  ed  products  can  be  estimated  between 
19.2mt  and  25.1mt  by  1995  (11%-15%)  of  Jhich  overcapacity  in 
I 
hot  rolled  coils  wi  II  account  for  about  3.8mt  up  to  8.4mt  (5-
11%).  For  liQUid  steel  excess  capacity  has  been  estimated 
between  31.8mt  and  43.2mt  (16-22.6%). - 3  -
2.  Description of  the Companies  Involved 
2.1  CSI  was  set  up  In  1991  to  co-ordinate  the  management  of  the 
holdings  of  the  state  holding  company  lnstituto  Nacional  de 
Indus t r i a  ( IN I )  and  the  pub I I  c  bank  BEX  in  AHV  and  Ens ides  a. 
AHV,  in  which  BEX  has  a  holding  of  80%,  is  situated  in  and 
around  Bilbao  (with  Iron  and  steel  making  centred  on  sites at 
Ansio  and  Sestao).  Ensldesa,  which  Is  100%  owned  by  INI,  is  in 
the  Asturias  region  (with  iron  and  steel  making  based  on  sites 
at  Gijon  and  Aviles). 
2.2 Combined  AHV/Ensldesa  current  declared  PMP  capacities  are  as 
follows: 
Liquid steel 
Hot-rolled  coi I 
Heavy  plate 
Long  products 
6.973 m tons 
4.665 m tons 
0.708 m tons 
0.970.m  tons 
In  1991  sales  totalled  5.3  m  tons  of  hot  rolled  equivalent 
product.  Of  this amount  1.369mt  were  sales of  hot-rolled col Is 
not  for  internal  consumption  (representing  6.7%  of  total  such 
EC  sales of  hot-rolled col Is),  with  the  remainder  of  hot-rolled 
coi I  product ion  being  used  for  Internal  consumption  downstream 
producing  sa I  es  of  fIat  products  as  fo I I  ows:  1 . 233mt  of.  co I  d-
rolled  coi 1  (10%  of  EC  sales)  and  1.296mt  of  coated  products 
(8%  of  EC  sales).  For  long  products  1991.  sales ·Were.  0.35mt  of 
wire  rod  (2.7%  of  EC  sales)  and  0.35mt  of  heavy  sectors  and 
profIles  (9.4%  of  EC  sales).  Sales of quarto plate were  0.55mt 
(10%  of  EC  sales). 
[Source:  Independent  consultant's report] 
3.  Current  Financial  Performance·of  the Company 
3.1  Despite  a  major  restructuring  of  the  Spanish  integrated  steel 
Industry  during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  (from  which 
.f 
1 
cl - 4  . 
Ensidesa/AHV  benefitted  from  aids  totalling  nearly  520(1) 
bi Irion  pesetas  (3.7  becus)),  this  procJss  lagged  behind  the 
I 
restr uctur i ngs  undertaken  by  other  EC  p1oducers  and  came  too 
late  to  obtain  the  ful I  benefit  of  the  marlcet  boom  in  1989/90. 
As  a  result,  and  in  the  llght  of  !deteriorating  marlcet 
conditions.  the  companies'  financial  performance  has  worsened. 
In  1990  AHV  and  Ensidesa  together  made  a  loss  of  9  bi II ion 
pesetas  (64  MECU)  on  a  turnover  of  278  bi Ilion  pesetas 
(1986  MECU)  which  increased  to  a  loss  of  near I y  55  b II I ion 
pesetas  (393  MECU)  in  1991  on  a  turnover  dt  282 bill ion  pesetas 
(2014  MECU).  Total  long  term  debts  at  the:  end of  1991  amounted 
to  approx  355  bi II ion  pesetas  (2500  MECU~.  i.e.  125~ of  1991 
turnover.  compared  with  combined  total  ebuity  of  108  billion 
pesetas  (77  MECU)  and  total  assets  of  578  bi I I ion  pesetas 
(4100  MECU). 
4.  The  Restructuring Plan 
4.1  The  main  elements of  the  plan  can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
Industrial 
.4.2  Under  the  plan  there  would  be  a  phased  programme  of 
reconflguration  and  modernisation/upgrading  of  the  combined 
capacities  of  AHV  and  Ens i desa.  by  which  integrated  iron  and 
stee  I  male i ng  and  hot  ro I I i ng .wou I d  be  concentrated  at  Ens ide  sa 
(Aviles  and  Gijon)  with  the  estab!ishmenJ  of  a  mini-mill  for 
flat  products  (electric  furnace  and  compalct  strip  technology) 
at  AHV  CSestao).  The  ma,in  changes  to  existing  product ion 
(1)  this  figure  excludes  so  bl I I ion  pesetas  for  possible  synergy 
between  the  two  companies  authorised  but  not  talcen  up.  The  aids 
granted  to  the  companies  represented  over  80%  of  total  aids 
authorised  for  Spain  in  1984-88.  However.  the  majority  of  the 
- I 
capacity  reductions  required  as  counterpart  flor  aid  were  made  by 
other  steel  companies  (AHV/Ensidesa  reduced  capacity  by  0.92mt  out 
I 
of  the  5.047mt  achieved  as  counterpart  for aid). - 5  -
faci I ities would  be  as  follows: 
( i)  closure  of  AHV's  blast  furnaces,. foreseen  for  the  end  of 
1994; 
( i i )  c I  osure  of  Ens ides  a's  b I ast  furnaces  at  Av i I  es, · foreseen 
.for  the  end  of  1995; 
( i i i)  ·upgrading  and  increase  of  capacIty  of  Ens i desa' s  2  b I ast 
furnaces  at  GIJon  from  1995;  and 
(iv)  closure of  AHV's  LD  converter  in  1994  and  hot  coi 1  mi  I I  at 
Ansio,  foreseen  for  the  end  of  1996. 
4.3 The  cost  of  associated  Investments  (including  downstream 
industrial  investments  in  transformation  facll ities,  such  as 
coating etc)  total  170  bl I I ion  pesetas  (1.2 becus). 
CapacIty 
4.4  In  terms  of  capaclty·reductlons,  the  plan would  provide  for  the 
following  net  reductions  by  1997: 
blast  furnace  35%  reduction  (down  to  4.270 mt) 
-1  iquid steel  20%  reduction  (down  to 5.55 mt) 
hot  coli  29%  reduction  (down  to 3.365 mt) 
The  net  reduction  in  hot  col I  capacity would  be  realised by  the 
closure  of  the  hot  strip  mill  at  Anslo  (capacity  2.3m.tons), 
and  Its  partial  replacement  by  a  new  compact.  strip  production 
unit  at  Sestao  (capacity  1  m tons). 
4.5  There  would  be  no  change  to capacity  In  long  products or plate. 
Further  detai Is,  by  plant,  including  timings,.  are  provided  at 
Annex  1. 
Sales 
4.6 The  plan  envisages  a  reduction  In  total  sales  from  5.3  mt  in 
1991  to  4.3  mt  In  1996,  the  obJective  being  to  mainta·in  CSI's 
Spanish  and  EC  market  share  for  flat  products,  and  to maintain 
or  slightly  reduce  its share of  the Spanish  and  EC  market  share 
for  quarto  plate  and  long  products.  (There  i·s,  however,  an - 6  -
increase  foreseen  for  coated  flat  products.) 
As  part  of  its  commercial  plan,  to  protect  Its  domestic  market 
share  agaInst  I  ncr  eased  foreIgn  competItIon  cs I  proposes 
Investments  of  35-50  b i II ion  pesetas,  of  whIch  10-18  b II I ion 
pesetas  would  be  allocated  for  participation  in  distribution 
companies  (part  of  this may  be  by  way  of  s~are exchange). 
Employment  Reductions 
4.8  The  plan  envisages  a  reduction  of  the  combined  AHV/Ensidesa 
workforce  from  24,489  In  1991  to  14,782  In  1998,  a  reduction of 
40%. 
Financial 
4.9  Under  the  plan  Ensidesa  and  AHV  wi  II  trajsfer  their  written-
down  assets  (and  commercial  I iabi lities,  amounting  to  104 
I  bi I I ion  pesetas  (793  MECU))  to  a  new  company  on  1  January  1993 
in  return  for  which  the  two  companies  wi  II  receive  shares  in 
the  new  company  valued  at  276.8  b i II  I  on  pesetas  ( 1.  9  BECU) 
(Ensidesa  207.573  bi 11  ion  pesetas  (1.4  BECU);  AHV  69.186 
billion  pesetas  (500  MECU)).  It  is  planned  that  these  shares 
wl  I I  then  be  sold  and  the  funds  used I to  meet  partially 
Ensldesa's  and  AHV's  obligations arising  frlom  their  winding  up, 
including  repayment  of  debts  not  transferred  to  the  new 
company.  AHV  and  Ensidesa  will  have  an  !obligation  to  offer 
their  shares  for  sale to  BEX  and  tNI. 
5.  Costs of  Restructuring 
5.1  The  total  cost  Is  estimated  at  804-824  billion  pesetas  (5.7-
5.9 BECU),  broken  down  as  follows: 
Debt  wr i te-offs 
Social  costs 
Debt  cancellation  through 
capital  conversion 
Other  (contingencies etc) 
Investment  Costs 
b I II ion  pesetas 
226.1  (1.6 BECU) 
236.6  (1.7  BECU) 
126.6  (909  UECU) 
9.4  (67  UECU) 
I 
205-220  (1.5-1 .6  BECU) - 7  -
Debt  wr i te-offs 
These  comprise  Ensidesa  debts  total I ing  146.8 bi I I ion  pesetas  (1.05 
BECU)  and  AHV  debts of  79.3 bil I ion  pesetas  (566  MECU)  and  would  be 
paid  from  funds  obtained  from  sales of  shares  in  the  new  company. 
Social  Costs 
The  figure of  236.6  bi I lion  pesetas  (1.7 BECU)  represents  the  total 
cost of  payments  to  the  9707  workers  made  redundant  or  ta~ing early 
retirement  under  the  plan. 
Debt  cancel latlon  through  capital  conversion 
This  involves  the  capitalisation  of  (a)  anINI  credit  of  35.5 
billion  pesetas  (254  MECU)  to  Ensidesa;  and  (b)  BEX  credits  to 
AHV  totalling  91.1  bi Ilion  pesetas  (650.7  MECU)  previously 
authorised  under  Protocol  10  of  Spain's Treaty of  Accession. 
Investment  Costs 
The  plan  envisages  commercial  and  Industrial  investments  totalling 
205-220  bi I I ion  pesetas  (1.5~1.6  BECU)  to  be  financed  by  the 
company  as  follows: 
upstream  industrial  investments 
(iron+ steel  works  and  hot 
reduction) 
downstream  industrial 
investments  (transformation 
facilities,  e.g.  coating etc.) 
commercial  investments  (Including 
increased participation  in 
distribution companies 
bn  pesetas 
117 
52 
35-50 
·uECU 
835.7 
371.4 
250-357 
of  the  upstream  industrial  investments  62.5  bi I I ion  pesetas - 8  -
(446.6 MECU)  (53%)  is  allocated  to  investment  in  a  new  electric 
furnace  and  compact  strip  facl I lty at  Sestao. 
6.  Proposed  State  Aids 
6.1  According  to  the  Spanish  authorities,  the  sale of  shares  in  the 
new  company  Is  not  an  aId;  and  the\  capIta I I sat ion  of 
convertible  debentures  and  credits total I ing  91  bi I I ion  pesetas 
I 
previously  authorised  should  not  be  regarded  as  new  aid.  The 
state  aid  requirement  involved  woul~ 
I 
therefore  total 
approximately  230  billion  pesetas  (1.6  BECU).  In  their  view, 
I 
under  the  Steel  Aids  Code  they  are  entitled  to  grant  aids 
total I ing  around  278  bi Ilion  pesetas  (2.0  BECU),  comprised  as 
follows: 
bn  pesetas  MECU 
(1)  Residual  book  value  of 
closed  AHV  and  Ensidesa 
i nsta II  at ions  69.5  496 
(2)  social  costs of  closure  118.3  845 
(3)  synergy  assistance  89  .. 8  641 
(Item  (3)  relates  to  the  60  billion  pesetas  synergy  assistance, 
author I sed  in  March  1987'  but  never  utI I ised,  uprated  for 
I n f  I at I on) . 
7.Commission  Appraisal 
7.1  In  determining  whether  the  Commissi•on  should  make  a  proposa-l 
under  Article 95  ECSC,  the  Commissi-on  needs  to estab I ish: 
( i )  whether  and  to  what  extent  the  pr-oposed  financing  of  the  .  I 
plan  constitutes  state  aids  al:'ld  whether  these  aids  are 
compat ib·le with  the  Steel  Aids  Code; 
( i i)  whether  the  measures  envIsaged  in  the  pI an  are  capab I e  of 
making  the  new  company  viable; 
( i  i i )  that  the  amount  of  aids  is  limited  to  what  is  strictly 
necessary;  and - 9  -
(iv)  that  there  should  be  adequate  counterpart  measures  in  the 
form  of  hot-rolled  capacity  reductions,  commensurate  with 
the  amount  of  aids  Involved,  In  order  to  ensure  that  the 
aids  do  not  distort  EC  competition  to an  extent  contrary  to 
the  common  interest. 
8.  The  financing of  the  Plan  and  State Aids 
8.1  Under  the  plan  the written  down  value  of  the  assets of  AHV  and 
Ensidesa  together  with  part  of  their  I iabi I ities  wi  I I  be 
transferred  into  a  new  company  to  be  established  on  1  January 
1993.  The  former  shareholders  (INI  and  BEX}  wi  I I  receive 
shares  from  the  new  company  with  a  nominal  value  of  276.7 
bi II ion  pesetas.  This  value  was  fixed  in  1991  when·  the  plan 
was  drawn  up.  These  shares  could  be  sold on  the  market  but  if 
no  buyer  is  found  the  Spanish  Government,  .through  the  public 
shareholders,  has  guaranteed  to  capitalise  the  shares  at  this. 
predetermined  value.  This obi igation  has  been  confirmed  to  the 
Commission  in  meetings  with  the  Spanish  authorities  and 
furthermore  is  the  basis  for  the  consultant's  conclusion  that 
the  CSI  plan  is viable.  It  is clear  that  if  this sum  cannot  be· 
achieved  the  financing  of  the  whole  plan  is  In  jeopardy.  The 
money  thus  raised  will  be  used  to  finance  the  restructuring 
plan  which  cannot  be  carried  out  without  it.  The  Spanish 
authorities do  not  consider  that  the operation  Involves  aid. 
However,  the  Commission  cannot· accept  this  view.  It  considers 
that  the  operation  Is  .equivalent  to  ·aid  In  the  form  of  a 
capital  injection  from  the  public authorities.  This  Is  because 
the  pub I i c  author It les  own  the  two  ·existing  compan les·  In 
difficulty  (through  INI  and  BEX),  Including  their  assets.  They 
w  iII  transfer  these asse.ts  to  the  new  company  without  receiving 
payment  for  them  and  wi  1 I  receive  shares  In  the  new  company  to 
a  nominal  value  of  276.7bn  pesetas.  Thus  the  public 
authorities  remain  the owners  of  the assets  In  the  new  company. 
However,  in  order  to  provide  capital  to  the  new  company  the 
public  authorities  wl  I I  buy  the  shares  they  already  own 
(through  INI  and  BEX)  from  themselves  at  the  predetermined 
nominal  value of  276.7bn  pesetas.  Therefore  this  is  not  a  sale 
of  shares  from  one  party  to  another  where  the  market  decides 8.2 
- 10  -
the  value  of  the  shares  but  Is  equivalent  to  the  provision  of 
new  equity  capital 
authorities. 
in  a  company  owned  by  the  pub I i c 
In  the  view  of  the  Commission,  the  ful I  amount  of  the  injection 
of  capital  constitutes state aid  as  It  cannbt  be  compared  to an 
Investment  by  a  commercIa I  investor  operJat i ng  under  market 
economy  principles.  This  view  is  based  on  the  previous 
performance  of  the  companies,  the  heavy  los~es which  have  given 
I  rise  to  the  need  for  the  present  rescue  package,  the  depressed 
market  situation  and  the  fact  that  one  o:f  the  Commission's 
consultants  estimates  the  worth  of  the  company  to  the 
I  shareholders  to  be  significantly  lower,  based  on  a  discounted 
cash  flow  analysis  of  the  restructuring  pl~n  after  subsidies. 
The  projected  return  on  capita I  of  an  a vel  age  of  1%  over  the 
period  1993-98  appears  too  low  to  be  attractive  to  a  private 
investor  operating under  normal  market  econbmy  principles. 
The  social  costs,  amounting  to  236.6bn  pesjtas,  will  be  met  to 
a  very  large extent  by  the public  sharehold~rs supported  by  the 
Spanish  State.  Therefore  the  Commission  cdnsiders  this  amount 
as  state  aid.  Article  56  of  the  ECSC  I  Treaty  provides  a 
possibi I ity  for  refinancing  part  of  this  amount  from  the  ECSC 
I 
budget.  The  exact  amount  of  the  Communltyis  contribution  wi  I I 
only  be  determined  after  negotiation of  a  social  plan  with  the 
Commission  and  wi  II  depend  on  factors  sucf  as  age,  length  of 
service,  retraining  needs,  etc.  Under  the  current  steel  aid 
I  code  (Decision  3855/91)  aid  I inked  to  closures  up  to  50%  of  the 
I 
amount  not  taken  under  Article 56  ECSC  may  be  deemed  compatible 
by  the  Commission  without  reQuiring  furthJr  Council  approval. 
At  this  stage  it  is  not possible  to  spl itl  the  sum  of  236.6bn 
pesetas  Into  the  above  categories or  to separate out  the  amount 
which  requires  new  aid  approval  under  Arficle  95  ECSC.  The 
ful I  amount  is  therefore  Included  in  the  present  proposal  as  a 
maximum  amount  of  social  aid  to  be  approved. 
8.3  In  add it ion  to  the  above,  the  State  will  convert  126.5  bn 
pesetas  from  loans  to  capital.  Of  this  amount  35.5bn  pesetas 
represents  new  aid,  the  remainder  having  already  been  approved - 11  -
in  the  past.  Finally,  the  plan also  includes 9.4bn ·pesetas  for 
contingencies. 
8.4 As  Indicated  in  5.1,  the  total  cost  of  the  restructuring  plan 
is  804-824bn  pesetas  (5.7-5.9bn  ecu)~  This  plani  as  is  shown 
above,  wi  I I  be  supported  by  aid  total I ing  558.2bn  pesetas 
(3.987bn  ecu).  Thus  68-69%  of  the  plan  is  financed  by  new  aid 
(79-81%  of  the  total  costs  will  be  met  by  aid  since  both  new 
and  previously  approved  aid  are  included  - see  10.6).  The 
remaining  19-21%  of  the  total  cost  will  be  financed  through 
cash  flow  generated  from  the  business  and  loans.  The  company 
expects  to  obtain  these  loans  from  commercial  sources  and  the 
Commission  therefore considers,  on  the basis of  the  information 
as  presented,  that  these measures  do  not  constitute state aids. 
This  case  is  similar  to.  all  previous  cases  of  aided  steel 
restructuring  in  that  there  is  a  certain  contribution  from  the 
company  to  the  cost  of  restructuring  although  the  major  burden 
is  borne  by  the  State.  However,  it  Is  clear  that  no  part  of 
the  plan  could  be  financed  without  the  aid  and  therefore  it 
does  not  make  economic  sense  to  allocate  aid  to  specific  cost 
items. 
9.  Financial  Viabi I ity of  the  new  company 
9.1  It  remains  the  Commission's  view,  as  in  the  case  of  previous. 
restructurlngs  of  the  Community  steel  Industry,  that  a  steel 
undertaking  cannot  hope  to  attain  lasting  financial  viabi I ity 
if  it  cannot  achieve,  under  normal  market  conditions, an  annual 
gross operating  result  of  13.5%  of  turnover. 
9.2 The  Commission  and  the  Spanish  Government  Jointly  appointed  an 
independent  consultant  to examine  the  vlabi llty of  the  proposed 
rest ructur i ng  pI an.  TheIr  assessment  was  based  on  cr Iter I  a 
identical  to  those  previously  imposed  by  the  Commission  during 
the  previous  restructuring  of  the  community  steel  industry, - 12  -
namely: 
a  price-cost  sQueeze  of  2.5%; 
a  minimum  depreciation  level  of  7%  In  lrder  to  guarantee  a 
replacement  of  the  activities  on  which  the  company's 
I  viabi I ity  Is  based  at  a  pace  equal  to  that of  competitors. 
I  a  level  of  financial  charges  not  lower  than  4.5%  of 
turnover,  wh lch  was  set  to  keep  state!  aId  to  the  strIct 
minimum; 
a  minimum  return  (1-1.5%  of  turnover)  on  own  capital  so 
that,  whether  the  capital  stems  from  public  or  private 
sources,  It  produces  a  fair  yield; 
realistic sales forecasts. 
9. 3  The  independent  consu I tant  assessed  a I l  the  measures  In  the 
plan  (including  the  industrial  reconfigJration)  and  their 
I  Impact  on  the  financial  situation of  the  company  and  concluded 
that  the  plan  would  lead  to  a  return  to  vlabi I ity  by  1996, 
based  on  the  following  sales  figures: 
thousand  ton7es 
Spain  EC(11)  Non-EG  Total 
Flat  products  2615  414  255  3274 
Quarto  plate and  long 
products  804  265  181  1250 
9.4 According  to  the  consultant's. analysis,  on  an  estimated 
turnover  of  303.171  billion  pesetas  (2.2  BECU)  the  company 
should  return  to  positive  operating  results  in  1996,  with  a 
gross  operating  return  of  17%,  financial  charges  of  5%  over 
sales,  depreciation of  10%  and  a  net  return of  2%. 
10.  Compatibi 1 ity with  Steel  Aids  Code 
10.1  Under  the  Steel  Aids  Code  only  the  following  aids  may  be 
considered  compatible  with  the  orderly  functioning  of  the 
common  market:  aid  for  research  and  development;  aid  for 
environmental  protection;  aid  for  the  cdsts  of  payments  to 
I  I  t  ·  t  ·  ·  workers  made  redundant  or  accepting  ear  y,  re  1 remen  ar 1 s 1 ng 
from  the  total  or  partial  closure of  steel  plants,  and  aid  to - 13  -
steel  undertakings  that  permanently  cease  production.  In 
addition.  aid  for  Investment  under  general  regional  aid  schemes 
may  a I  so  be  a I I  owed  in  Greece  and  Por tug  a I  (to  sma I I  and 
medium-sized  undertakings  only).  provided  that  there  is  no 
increase  in  the  undertaking's  production  capacity,  and  In  the 
former  GDR  provided  that  there  is  a  reduct ion  in  the  over  a II 
production  capacity of  that  territory.  AI  I  other  aids  for  the 
steel  industry  are  prohibited  by  Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty. 
10.2  In  the  Commission's  view.  of  the  financing  measures  under  the 
plan  only  a  proportion of  the  declared  aids  towards  the  social 
costs  of  closure  would  be  compatible  with  the  code.  The 
maximum  total  social  costs  of  the  plan  are  236.6  bi I I ion 
pesetas  ( 1.  7  bn  ECU).  whIch  accordIng  to  the  SpanIsh 
authorities would  be  borne  by  the State.  The  precise  breakdown 
of  this  figure  is  not  known.  A proportion  of  the  costs  may  be 
covered  by  Community  assistance  under  Article  56  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty;  and  a  proportion  would  be  compatible  with  the  Steel 
Aids  Code.  However,  this  remains  to  be  determined.  depending 
on  the  Spanish  Government's  applications  for  EC  funds. 
Therefore  for  the  purposes  of  this  analysis  the  maximum  total 
State aid  is  236.6  bi I lion  pesetas  (1.7bn  ECU). 
10.3 As  noted  in  paragraph  6.1  the  Spanish authorities consider  that 
they  are  also  entitled  under  the  code  to  grant  the  following 
aids without  recourse  to Article 95  ECSC: 
bn  pesetas 
Residual  book  value of 
closed  instal lations 
Synergy  assistance 
(60  bi I lion pesetas previously 
authorised.  uprated  f~r  Inflation 
69.5 
89.8 
MECU 
496.4 
641.4 
They  also  take  the  view  that  the  capital isatlon  of  previously 
authorised  AHV  convertible  debenture  and  credits  total I ing  91 
bi I I ion  pesetas  (650  MECU)  under  Protocol  10  of  Spain's Treaty - 14  -
of  Accession  should  not  be  regarded  as  new  aid. 
10.4 Under  Article  4.2  (c)  of  the  Code  aid  fo1  closures  based  on 
residual  book  value  of  plants  is  I imlted  to  undertakings  which 
I  permanent I  y  cease  product ion.  In  thIs  case  a I though  AHV  and 
Ens i desa  w  i I I  cease  activities  only  certain  of  their 
instal lations  are  to  be  closed  and  the  new  company  wi  1 I 
effectively  be  controlled  by  the  same  undertakings  (BEX  and 
INI)  that  control led  AHV  and  Ensldesa.  I  The  Commission  is 
therefore  unable  to accept  the  Spanish  argument. 
10.5 Synergy  assistance  of  60  bi II ion  pesetas  (428.6  bn  ECU)  was 
originally  authorised  by  the  Commission  in  March  1987  but  the 
terms  and  conditions attaching  to  that  authorisation were  never 
met  (in particular,  presentation of  a  plan Jefore  31  March  1988 
and  payment  of  the  aid  before  the  end +  1988)  so  In  the 
Commission's  view  It  must  now  be  regarded  as  new  aid. 
10.6 The  Commission  can,  however,  accept  that  cjpltallsation of  the 
I 
AHV  debentures  and  credits  tot  a I I i ng  91  b i I I i·on  pesetas  (650 
MECU)  was  foreseen  at  the  time  of  the  ori[ginal  authorisation 
and  need  not  be  treated as  new  aid. 
10.7  It  follows  from  the  above  that  the  total  new  state aids  in  this 
I 
case  therefore  amount  to  a  maximum  of  558.2  b i I I ion  pesetas 
(3.987  BECU)  in  support  of  total  restruct~ring  costs  of  804-
824bn  pesetas  (5.7-5.9bn ecu). 
11.  Minimum  Necessary  Aid/Counterpart  Measures 
11.1  The  independent  consultant  jointly  commissioned  by  the 
Commission  and  the  Spanish  Government  concll uded  that  the  p I  an 
as  proposed  was  viable.  This  is  a  necessany  condition  for  the 
plan  to  be  accepted.  However,  it  is  not  the  only  condition 
that  must  be  fulfl I led.  It  Is essential  that  the  aid supported 
plan  has  the  least  possible distortlve eftebt  on  competition  in 
the  EC  steel  market. 
11.2  The  Spanish  proposal  must  be  considered  in  the  I ight  of  the 
current  difficulties  on  the  EC  steel  market  in  which  a! I 
I 
I Hot 
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companies  are suffering financially  from  the  col lapse of  prices 
with  no  immediate  prospect  of  market  recovery.  The  impact  of 
the  volume  of  aid  and  the  timing  of  the  closures  proposed  must 
be  seen  In  the  context  of  this market  situation.  As  noted  in 
paragraph  4.4,  the  plan  proposes  net  capacity  reduct ions  in 
liquid  steel  of  20%  (1.423  mt)  and  hot-rolled  col I  of  29% 
(1.3mt),  which  wll I  make  a  useful  contribution  towards  reducing 
the  current  EC  excess  capacIty  In  hot-rolled  col Is.  However, 
It  must  be  noted  that  these closures wl  II  not  occur  immediately 
and  the  reduct ion  In  coils  will. not  take  place  unt i I  1997. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  estimates  that  by  1995  there  wl  I I  be 
an  overcapacity  in  I i quId  stee I  of  around  43. 2mt  ( 22. 6%).  In 
hot  rolled  products,  under  the  lower  production  scenario,  the 
excess  capacity  is  I ikely  to  reach  25mt  (14.8%)  and  in  the 
product  categories where  CSI  is  represented  the situation  is  as 
follows: 
OvercaDac I  tY 
1992  1995 
Tonnes  X  Tonnes  ·x 
rolled col 1  7.3m  9.8  8.4m  11 
Plate  2.2m  15.6  2.8m  19.8 
Heavy  section  3.1m  19.9  4.4m  28 
Wire  rod  0.9m  4.2  cLam  •4 
Therefore,  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the  relation  between  the 
aid  intensity  and  the  extent  of  the  restructuring  pr·oposed  needs  to  be 
improved. 
12.  The  Commission's  Position  and  conditions  it  intends  to  attach  to 
its authorisation of  state aids 
The  Commission  has  considered  the  proposa I  · of  the  Spanish 
authorities  to grant  aid  up  to  3.98bn  ecu  for .the  restructuring of 
the steel  company  CSI.  The  Commission  has  decided,  on  the  basis of 
a  report  from  a  consultant  jointly designated  by  the  Commission  and 
the  Spanish  authorities,  that  the  plan  for  CSI  is  viable  and  that - 16  -
it  represents  a  courageous  and  constructive  approach  to  the 
restructuring  of  the  Spanish  steel  industry.  However,  in  the 
light  of  the  current  difficulties  on  the  EC  steel  market,  the 
Commission  takes  the  view  that  the  relation  between  the  aid 
intensity  and  the  extent  of  the  restructuring  droposed  needs  to  be 
improved. 
It  is  clear  that  without  restructuring  CSI  would  be  unable  to 
continue  to  operate.  which  would  further  agdravate  the  serious 
social  and  economic  problems  of  the  regions  co~cerned.  It  is  also 
clear  that  the  restructuring  involves  Stat~  aids  which  are 
incompatible  with  the  Steel  Aids  Code  and  are !normally  prohibited 
by  Article  4(c)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  but  which  could  be  authorised 
under  Article 95  ECSC. 
12.1  This  case  must  a I  so  be  seen  in  the  I ight  of  the  Community· s 
internatlonal  obi igations.  and  in  particular  the  suspended 
I 
12.2 
negotiations  in  GATT  on  a  steel  trade  agreement  and  the  current 
dispute with  the  USA  over  steel  imports. 
The  Commission  therefore  takes  the  view  thalt  the  aids  proposed 
should  be  authorised subject  to  the  following  conditions: 
Cal  taking  into account  the  Commission's  v,Jw  that  the relation 
I 
between  the  aid  intensity  and  the  extent  of  the 
I 
restructuring  proposed  needs  to  be  improved,  that  the 
.viability  of  the  restructuring  to  be  barried  out  can  be 
shown  to  be  assured;  I 
(b).that  all  capacity  reductions  should  be  of  a  genuine  and 
irreversible nature. 
(C)  the  new  company's  level  of  financial  charges  should  not 
fall  below  4.5%  during  the  restructuring  period  (I.e.  up 
unt i I  1998). 
(d)  alI  proceeds  from  the  sale of  shares  must  be  used  to  repay 
alI  remaining  debts of  the  dormant  compJnies  as  is  provided 
for  in  the  CS I  pI an.  I 
(e)  the  installations  closed  must  not  be  sold  for  subsequent 
use  in  Europe. - 17  -
(f)  the  new  company  shall  not  claim tax  relief  on  past  losses 
which  are  covered  by  aid under  the  terms of  this decision. 
The  Commission  presents  this  communication.  with  a  view  to 
submit  on  that  basis  In  due  course  to  the  Counci I  a  draft 
decision  based  on  Article 95  of  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
12.3  Furthermore.  as  is  usual  In  such  cases.  the  Commission 
Decision  will  provide  for  regular  monitoring  reports  to  check 
on  satisfactory  implementation  of  the  plan.  The  monitoring 
wi  II  also  cover  the  financing  of  the  Investment  costs  in  order 
to ensure  that  they  follow  normal  market  economy  principles  and 
do  not  involve state aid; 
12.4  The  Commission  will  also  present  this  communication  to. the 
Consultative Committee. 
12.5  The  Commission  undertakes  to keep  the  Member  States  informed  on 
a  regular  basis of  the  progress of  the  restructuring. FORECAST  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CSI  PRODUCTION  CAPACITY 
Thousand  Tons 
PMP 
INSTALLATION  CapacIty  1992  1993  1994 
Aviles  Coke  Battery  1 .325  1. 325  1. 325  1.325 
Gijon  Coke  Battery  1 .050  1.050  1.050  1 .050 
Vizcaya  Coke  Battery  1. 210  1.210  1.210  1.210 
TOTAL  BATTERIES  3.585  3.585  3.585  3.585 
Av i I  es Sinter  2.350  2.350  2.350  2.350 
Gi Jon  Sinter  2.925  2.925  2.925  2.925 
Vizcaya  Sinter  3.300  3.300  3.300  3.300 
TOTAL  SINTER  8.575  8.575  8.575  8.575 
Aviles  Blast  Furnace  2.400  2.400  2.400  2.400 
GiJon  Blast  Furnace  2.220  2.220  2.220  3.600 
Vlzcaya  Blast  Furnace  1.980  1.980  1 .980  1 .570 
TOTAL  PIG  IRON  6.600  6.600  6.600  7.570 
Aviles  Blast  LDI  I I  2.573  2.573  2.573  3.300 
G  i jon  B  I ast  LD  2.200  2.200  2.200  1 .250 
Vizcaya  Blast  LD  2.200  2.200  2.200  2.200* 
TOT Al_L.I.QUJD_STEEL  6-.-973  6-;-973--6-:-973  6-:750 
Av i I es  HSM  2.365  2.365  2.365  2.365 
Vizcaya  HSM(Anslo)  2.300  2.300  2.300  2.300 
STEEL/CC/HSM(Sestao)  - - - -
TOTAL  HOT-ROLLED  COIL  4.665  4.665  4.665  4.665 
Heav}'  plate  708  708  708  708 
Structurals  450  450  450  450 
Wire  rod  520  520  520  520 
-·----... ~ 
....  New  electric furnace  production  begins  in  Vizcaya  (Sestao) 
**  The  new  technology  (compact  steelworks)  becomes  operational 
C - Closure 
1995  1996  1997 
1. 325  800  800 
1 .050  1 .050  1 .050 
c  c  c 
2.375  1 .850  1 .850 
2.350  c  c 
2.925  2.925  2.925 
c  c  c 
5.275  2.925  2.925 
1.600  c  c 
4.270  4.270  4.270 
c  c  c 
5.870  4.270  4.270 
3.300  3.300  3.300 
1. 250  1.250  1.250 
1. 500**  1.500**  L_O.O.O 
6.050  6.050  5.550 
2.365  2.365  2.365 
2.300  1 .300  c 
- 1.000***  1.000 
4.665  4.665***  3.365 
708  708  708 
450  450  450 
520  520  520 
Capacity  Reduction 
1991-1997 
Ktn  " 
525  40 
1. 210  100 
1.  735  48 
2.350  100 
3.300  100 
5.650  66 
2.400  100 
{2.050)  {  192) 
1.980  100 
2.330  35 
(727)  (28) 
950  43 
1-..200~~54 
1 .423  20 
1 .300  57 
1.300  29 
in  Vizcaya  around  the  end  of  1995 
.  .Jt,l·  l~trin0  the  second  half  of  1996  one  reheating  furnace  of  the  Ansio Mill  (reduced  from  two);  the 
~ ... w HSM  {compact  strip production)  for  Vizcaya  (Sestao)  is  for  the  second  half  of  1997 
source  CSI 
..  .  ;  ... 
-· 
0(:. 
i 